Foto credits: CEC, Priit Rohtmets at the Conference of CEC in Helsinki in Dec. 2025
You are Estonian – what can you tell us about the current mood in your country – especially concerning Russia?
I will begin my answer with history, because I am a church historian. In the 20th century, Estonia experienced the birth of its own state, just like the Finns, Latvians, Lithuanians, and many Central European peoples. The Republic of Estonia was established in 1918. To achieve independence, we had to fight a War of Independence against Russia, which Estonia won despite its small size. Thus, on the one hand, we have the experience of having our own state, gained through victory in war. On the other hand, in 1940 the Soviet Union occupied the Republic of Estonia, followed by approximately 50 years of occupation.
Although in Western Europe and elsewhere there was an understanding in 1991 that the collapse of the Soviet Union, which for us meant the end of the occupation period and the restoration of the independence of the Republic of Estonia on the basis of legal continuity, would bring about the triumph of democracy, it became clear to us already in the 1990s how difficult it is to free oneself from the grip of a former occupier in order to join the family of European nations and NATO.
The purpose of this long introduction is to say that although Estonia is very close to Russia and Russia’s war in Ukraine therefore affects us very directly, and although the mood in society is anxious, due to our historical experience we were well aware of the sentiments prevailing in Russia, that is, of Russian imperialist ambitions, and we have had no illusions about Russia for decades.
Therefore, we know that alongside keeping our own society united and maintaining military strength, even now during the war we must continue to make efforts to ensure that the rest of the world, who don’t have a first-had experience with Russia, understand that Russia’s modus operandi is the same as that of the Soviet Union: today Ukrainian children are being abducted; in 1941, virtually the entire Estonian elite, including our president and the commander-in-chief of our armed forces, was deported to Siberia in cattle wagons; and in 1949, tens of thousands of peasants were deported from Estonia and other western territories occupied by the Soviet Union to Siberia in order to suppress resistance to the occupation authorities.
Estonia is considered one of the most secular countries in Europe. Nevertheless, there are numerous denominations there, including two Orthodox churches, one subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchate and (the other one to Constantinople.?). How is interdenominational dialogue going since the war in the Ukraine?
There is no state church in Estonia, and according to census data from 2021 the country is indeed one of the most secular in Europe: only 29% of people define themselves as religious, while 58% do not wish to express any opinion on the matter at all. Altogether, there are almost 600 religious associations in Estonia. They are registered as NGO-s and there is a Catholic community, who acts according to an agreement signed in 1999 by the Republic of Estonia and the Holy See. Among the almost 600 religious associations there are 91 independent congregations and around 500 religious organizations that are grouped into churches, unions of congregations, and other religious organizations. Sociological studies of religion conducted in Estonia have shown that religious motifs are also present in the worldviews of people who define themselves as non-religious; thus, Estonia’s religious landscape is a fascinating field of study for scholars of religion. A similar process of secularization, which has already taken place in Estonia, is currently occurring elsewhere in Europe and in North America as well.
There are two Orthodox churches in Estonia for historical reasons. When Estonia became independent in 1918, Orthodox believers, much like those in the Balkan states, wished, following political independence, to also achieve ecclesiastical independence from the Russian Orthodox Church. To this end, in 1923 they turned together with the Finns to the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, which within Orthodoxy has helped resolve questions concerning church structures. Because the Estonian and Finnish churches were too small and lacked a sufficient number of bishops, the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople took the Orthodox believers of Estonia and Finland into the jurisdiction of his church, granting these churches autonomous status, under which they governed themselves locally. In the late 1930s, the Latvian Orthodox Church followed the same path.
The occupation of 1940 brought major changes here as well, as the Russian Orthodox Church unlawfully terminated the activities of the existing churches in Estonia and Latvia and, in violation of canon law, incorporated their congregations into its own structure. In 1944, the heads of the Latvian and Estonian Orthodox Churches fled to the West, fearing that the Soviet authorities would kill them. The Orthodox Church of Estonia continued its activities in exile, whereas the Orthodox Church of Latvia gradually faded away. In the early 1990s, the Orthodox Church of Estonia was restored in Estonia, but this did not happen in Latvia, because in one case the church had continued its activities in exile, while in the other it had not. In Latvia, only the structure of the Russian Orthodox Church remained active, whereas in Estonia a situation emerged in which, alongside the restored Orthodox Church of Estonia, congregations of the Russian Orthodox Church were also operating. After a long dispute, the state made concessions to the latter and in 2002 registered them as the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.
This church is part of the Russian Orthodox Church and represents a Russian imperialist interpretation of history within Estonian society. Such propaganda became especially active prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, to the extent that the church even published a special issue in which it criticized Ukraine’s aspirations for ecclesiastical independence and asserted that Estonian territory historically belongs to the Russian Orthodox Church. This is also connected to the promotion of the “Russian World” ideology, as the Russian Orthodox Church counts all Russian-speaking people as part of the Russian World and, on this basis, expands its territory by employing the concept of canonical territory, which in fact is an idea foreign to Orthodox ecclesiology. Canonical territory is understood to include not only areas that were once part of the Russian Empire, but also territories where there are Russian-speaking people and representatives of Russian culture. The Russian Church is a global project and is inseparably linked to the ambitions of the Russian state to be a major global power.
The Estonian state has taken a very clear position on this: it is not acceptable. As a result, in 2024 the Republic of Estonia did not extend the residence permit of Metropolitan Yevgeny, a Russian citizen who headed the structure of the Russian Orthodox Church in Estonia, and he returned to Russia. One of the reasons for this is that the church is far from engaging solely in religious activity; it also pursues political objectives. Politics is conducted through the promotion and defense of Russia’s historical narrative and interests.
From a historical point of view – what do you think about the “Russian world” – theory? Has it any true essence?
As noted, this has very little to do with traditional Orthodox canon law, because the Orthodox Church is based on the understanding that the Church is divided territorially, not along national or cultural lines, and that ecclesiastical territory generally follows political borders. Accordingly, the Russian Orthodox Church should operate within the borders of the Russian Federation, yet it has ambitions to be present both in regions that were once part of the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union, as well as elsewhere where there are Russian-speaking people.
Most tragically, the ideas of the “Russian World” are being exploited to justify the Russian war in Ukraine. For the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian state, this is framed as a historical issue, since they rely on the notion of a single thousand-year-old civilization that began in Kyiv in 988. In reality, however, the Russian Orthodox Church became independent only in the 15th century and received formal confirmation of this status from the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople only in the 16th century. Moreover, the Kyiv Metropolis functioned independently of the Russian Orthodox Church until the end of the 17th century and was instead under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.
As the Russian Empire steadily expanded and in the 17th century occupied Ukrainian territories, the local ecclesiastical structure there was dismantled. All these developments thus occurred much later, and although the roots of the Russian Orthodox Church may indeed reach back to the year 988, this does not constitute the history of a single Russian Orthodox Church; rather, it is an intertwined history of multiple peoples and churches.
By the aim to preserve this imperial identity, Ukraine is also being attacked. In reality, what we are witnessing is the long process of the disintegration of the Russian Empire that began in 1917. It is a process that the Russian Federation is now resisting at any cost. Ecclesiastical affiliation plays a key role here, because without the Russian Orthodox Church, the cohesion of the Russian imperial dream and the “Russian World” would also fall apart.
The Orthodox Church has described defining the Church on the basis of nationality, culture, and language as ethnophyletism, and in 1872 this was declared a heresy by the Church. From this follows the heretical nature of the “Russian World.”
Have you ever met the Moscow Patriarch Kyrill? If not in real life, how would you argue if you had the possibility to talk to him? Would you confront him with the accusation of heresy?
I have never met Kirill, but if I were to meet him, I would probably speak to him in the same way about history and about the fact that the Russian state has unfortunately so far been unable to deal honestly with its past, including acknowledging the mistakes and injustices committed in history. This is also why Russia continues to pose a threat to Europe and to the entire world. I would tell him that without repentance, there can be no forgiveness, and only repetence can be a way forward.
Are there other Theologians/professors/priests, who have published about the theological aspects of “russkyi mir”?
Because this topic serves as an ideological foundation for Russia’s war in Ukraine, the concept of the “Russian World” is currently being studied very actively. This is being done by theologians, historians, and social scientists alike. One recent example is the edited volume (Eds. Marietta van der Tol, Sophia R.C. Johnson, Petr Kratochvíl, Zoran Grozdanov) The Many Faces of Christianism: The “Russian World” in Europe, published by Brill in 2025, which is available for free download and reading online.[1]
Unlike the Catholic Church or free churches, most Protestant and Orthodox churches are organised nationally. Is there a stronger tendency towards nationalism and authoritarianism in countries that are Protestant or Orthodox?
Nationalism should in fact be foreign to Orthodoxy, because the Church is meant to bring together people of different nationalities within a single territory and thus be transnational, just as the Christian message itself is. At the same time the Orthodox Church has traditionally maintained close relations with the state; Orthodoxy even has a specific term for this – the concept of symphonia, meaning harmony between secular and spiritual authority. However, since modern states are largely nation-states and nationality has played a very important role in individual and societal self-identification since the 19th century, the Orthodox Church has also had to engage with the national question.
Here, a balance has been sought, because it is clear that nationality cannot simply be ignored, yet it cannot be the primary marker of identity within the Church, nor can it be linked to any notion of chosenness, as if for example Orthodoxy were somehow especially characteristic of a particular nation.
The Orthodox Church is a hierarchical institution, in which the Church is organized around the bishop, and this hierarchical structure is also why it is often associated with authoritarianism. In reality, however, this depends greatly on the broader society and its historical background, because in Europe, in both Protestantism and Orthodoxy, there are very different examples of the role the Church plays in society.
In view of these socio-political dangers, what is the difference between Protestant and Orthodox theology/churches?
From a theological and ecclesiological perspective, Protestantism and Orthodoxy differ somewhat in ways that also shape their respective socio-political roles. Orthodoxy understands the Church primarily as a sacramental, historical, and visible community that is territorially organized and gathered around the bishop. Authority is transmitted through apostolic succession, tradition, and synodality, and the Church places strong emphasis on continuity, liturgy, and embodied communal life. Because of this historical and institutional continuity, Orthodox churches have often developed close relationships with the state. The classical Orthodox ideal of symphoniahas in favorable circumstances enabled cooperation, but in unfavorable contexts it has also made Orthodoxy more vulnerable to political instrumentalization, nationalism, and authoritarian regimes.
Protestant churches by contrast emerged out of a critical stance toward centralized ecclesiastical authority. Theologically, Protestantism places greater emphasis on Scripture, conscience, and justification by faith, and ecclesiologically it allows for a much wider range of church models, from episcopal to presbyterial to congregational. This plurality has made Protestant churches structurally more fragmented, but also more flexible and, as history as shwon us, in many contexts more capable of distancing themselves from state power.
Importantly neither tradition is inherently nationalist or authoritarian. The decisive factor is not theology alone, but as said earlier the broader historical, political, and cultural environment in which churches operate.
The statement (from Helsinki) only names certain heretical elements. What do you think of this statement as the outcome of the conference?
I consider this statement to be very successful, because it addresses the idea of the “Russian World” for the first time at the ecumenical level. This is important, because the Christian Church, despite being divided into different communions, is nevertheless one, and when it speaks as such, its voice undoubtedly carries great weight.
But we must also ask: what is the goal? It was, I believe, Pope Francis who said at the beginning of Russia’s war against Ukraine that this war is above all a moral bankruptcy. It is also the role of the churches to say that one church has gone astray. This needs to be acknowledged, because paradoxically we may think, for example as Protestants, that we have nothing to do with the false teaching of the Russian Orthodox Church, yet fundamentally it ultimately shakes the entire Christian world when religion is instrumentalized in this way and people are killed in the name of God. This affects the whole of Christianity.
One gets the impression that the madness currently unfolding worldwide is completely beyond control. What can we actively do? And what concrete steps can the churches take?
While the situation may feel hopeless, churches can respond through clear moral witness, public advocacy, and teaching that distinguishes faith from ideology. The Community of Protestant Churches in Europe has shown with its declaration, which was passed on 18 March 2022 but the Council how this can be done, speaking out against injustice, defending human dignity, and upholding the universal nature of the Church. Equally important is prayer for peace, which strengthens communities, fosters discernment, and reminds us that the Church belongs to Christ alone.
What gives you hope?
The freedom that Christ and Christianity offer to every human being. This freedom is not merely personal, because it shapes how we live together in society and how we engage with the world. That freedom enables churches and communities to stand up for human dignity, to resist oppression, and to work for peace. I also think that it shows that Christianity continues to have a real and tangible influence in global affairs, offering both guidance and courage to act rightly.
Priit Rohtmets is a Associate Professor at the University of Tartu and Professor of Church History at the Theological Institute of the Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church. He is a researcher with a special interest in Estonian, Baltic, and Scandinavian church history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and has done research on state–church relations, history of Orthodox Churches in the Baltic states and in the Balkans, the relationship between nationalism, and religion in Northern Europe and the ecumenical movement in the Baltic States.